Epilogue: The Way Forward - An Extract from the PUCL-constituted Independent Tribunal's Manipur Report

More than two years have passed since the conflict erupted in Manipur. The situation between the Kuki and Meitei communities remains tense, fractured, and profoundly unresolved. The hope that time would begin to heal has not yet materialized in any meaningful way. Despite some efforts at peace-building—including the first symbolic peace talks held on 5th April, 2025—the process remains painfully slow, deeply fragile, and without the trust or groundwork needed for reconciliation.

The 5th April meeting, hosted under the initiative of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), was the first joint meeting of Meitei and Kuki representatives since the violence began. It lasted five hours and was seen as a cautious but important step. However, it must be noted that the main Meitei umbrella body, COCOMI, chose not to attend, instead sending proxy organizations. The Kuki-Zomi Council (KZC), representing the Kuki community, did attend and expressed a willingness to talk. But refused to sign on the minutes and so-called agreement reached. Yet, without the full participation of the core stakeholders, including COCOMI and the Suspension of Operations (SoO) groups, there remains deep scepticism about the efficacy and sincerity of these efforts.

Civil society acknowledged that while this was just a symbolic meeting, it was the first time that the representatives from the two communities sat together at the table and therefore it was a welcome move. Following this meeting an announcement was made by the Governor of Manipur in the first week of July that all relief camps will soon be closed. This added a new layer of concern and fear, particularly among the displaced Kuki community. From the Kuki perspective, this announcement does not represent a return to normalcy but rather an administrative attempt to erase the reality of their displacement. Thousands remain unable to return to their homes, especially in and around Imphal. These include families who have lived in the city for generations, such as those from the old Lambulane area, now emptied of Kukis since the May 2023 violence. The fear is palpable: there are no security guarantees, no rehabilitation framework in place, and little trust in the state’s promises. The reality is that if the camps are closed, many will be left to scatter in unsafe conditions, outside of any formal support.

Here is the 6-point roadmap, as presented by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) during the 5th April peace talks between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo representatives:

1. Cease hostilities: Both communities are urged to refrain from attacking one another and immediately halt violence.
2. Facilitate safe return of IDPs: Support and enable the return of internally displaced persons to their homes under secure conditions.
3. Consult on long-term issues: Engage both communities in structured dialogue to address core disputes like land rights, tribe status, and political representation.
4. Prioritize regional development: Launch focused infrastructure and welfare initiatives, especially in neglected hill and valley areas, to bridge socio-economic disparities.
5. Ensure free movement on highways: Open and maintain national and state highways (e.g., NH-2 and NH-37) to reconnect hills and valley and resume essential supply chains.
6. Build inter-community cooperation: Promote collaboration—through civil society groups, local administrations, and task forces to normalize daily life and maintain peace.

One of the clearest indicators that normalcy has not returned is the complete lack of safe access for Kukis to essential infrastructure in Imphal. The airport remains out of reach. Hospitals like RIMS and JNIMS, once serving people from across communities, are no longer accessible to Kuki patients. Even transportation routes remain unsafe. The national highway between Churachandpur and Kangpokpi, for instance, is not accessible to Kukis, forcing them to take interior, dangerous village roads.

This breakdown in connectivity has consequences far beyond travel. Medical services in the hill areas are in a dire crisis. In places like Saikul, only two doctors are currently available to serve the entire area—clearly an untenable situation. Emergency healthcare, including childbirth, is dangerously compromised, and in some instances, people have had to go to other states for basic treatments. The health infrastructure has collapsed, and staffing is near-impossible, since Meitei professionals will not work in Kuki-dominated areas, and vice versa.

Similarly, the educational crisis is immense and widely unaddressed. Students pursuing higher and professional education—particularly in medical, engineering, or science disciplines—have been completely derailed. The main institutions are located in Imphal, now inaccessible to Kukis. Many young people have dropped out, especially those without the means or family networks outside the state. Online education has proven to be a hollow alternative: there is no library access, no laboratory, and no stable internet in the remote hills. Entire academic years have been lost, and many students don’t know how or where to restart. The damage to their futures is incalculable.

Governance, as a system, has broken down. The administrative divide is now so stark that officers and public servants refuse to serve in areas dominated by the “other” community. The result is a near-total collapse of state services—from public transportation to ration distribution and health to infrastructure development. People across both communities feel abandoned, but the Kukis, particularly in the hills, feel entirely cut off from the mechanisms of the state.

A particularly painful point of grievance for Kukis is the lingering assumed association with poppy cultivation and the drug trade. During the early phase of the conflict, this narrative was used as a weapon to paint them as criminal and illegitimate. Today, many Kuki intellectuals push back strongly against this characterisation. They argue that the drug crisis affects all communities in Manipur, and the pushers are often protected by powerful political and police networks. They point out that dreams of quick riches lure many youths, whether Meitei or Kuki or other communities in Manipur. However, the real culprits—those at the top of the network—are untouched. There are even rumours, widely believed in the hills, of the son of a Union Minister being involved in the drug trade. Despite government claims of poppy destruction and FIRs, there is little public evidence of follow-through. Where are the big arrests? Where is the crackdown?

The narrative of the outsider and infiltrator also troubles the Kuki community and they are wondering whether these can be overcome without being addressed by authorities, who deny these charges. Indeed, people say that nothing has changed, except that Chief Minister Biren Singh is no longer directly in charge. But even this change has made no tangible difference on the ground. If anything, things have worsened. Roads are deteriorating fast, particularly during this unusually heavy monsoon. Relief distribution has become irregular and inadequate. Development projects have stalled. In Saikul, people recently met with the health department to raise their concerns. Only two doctors run the local centre, which is impossible for a community with urgent needs. Prices are rising, access to urban markets remains difficult, and the feeling is one of being trapped—geographically, politically, and socially.

The para military presence, once reassuring, has shrunk. The Assam Rifles, trusted by many Kukis, are now largely absent. The CRPF and BSF are seen as ineffective, especially since they operate under the local police leadership, which is widely perceived to be biased.

The law has also not been applied equally. FIRs lodged by Kukis, numbering in the thousands, have gone nowhere. Of the total of 6000 + FIRs, on many UAPA is being applied—sometimes excessively and selectively—to both Meiteis and Kukis. The perception is that the government is criminalising dissent and arresting foot soldiers, while the real planners of violence remain free. This is particularly in the context of AT and ML.

There is bitterness among Kukis that the Governor, who assumed office during this crisis, has never met them or their representatives. He did, however, meet the Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun groups immediately after taking charge. This alone has shattered any remaining belief in his neutrality.

From their side, the Meitei community too has voiced disenchantment. Leaders, intellectuals, and even elected MPs have called the peace process a charade. They feel used and misled, their own suffering instrumentalised.

From the Meitei side, there is also despair. There is a sense that nothing is changing, that the youth are being arrested while leaders roam free. There are complaints that rehabilitation packages are inadequate—₹75,000 for a home is a cruel joke in a community that lives in shared housing. There is widespread anger at Union Home Minister Amit Shah for what is seen as a betrayal. Promises made were not kept. Women, in particular, feel they were used at the peak of the conflict and then excluded from peace efforts. Meira Paibis have withdrawn. Women are absent from both Track 1 and Track 2 dialogues. Even those willing to return to their villages are holding back. Without trust, they say, there can be no return. Buffer zones are now being treated as permanent boundaries. The Nagas are staying out. Certain Tangkhul leaders, are seen to be actively provoking unrest against Kukis, further souring relations.

Hate speech, earlier virulent, has died down—not from reconciliation, but from exhaustion. People are tired. The violence has paused, but peace has not begun.

Shared grief surfaced at the tragic deaths of two young Manipuri air hostesses—one Meitei and one Kuki. A senior journalist noted that when the news broke, the state mourned both as Manipuris, not divided by community. There was even a gesture from the Meitei leadership urging that the Kuki family bring their daughter’s body back to Imphal. But fear won out. Instead, the family chose to travel from Ahmedabad to Dimapur, and from there to their current shelter in Kangpokpi. Their home in Imphal, once in the heart of Lambulane, remains abandoned. This, according to the journalist, is the tragedy of Manipur: brief glimpses of unity, followed by reversion to division. Unless both communities can move past victim and perpetrator roles, unless they meet in truth and reconciliation, the status quo will persist. Track 2 meetings—friendly, intellectual gatherings—are happening, but they lack the political teeth to change realities. True dialogue must bring hostile parties face to face, and must include all SoO groups if it is to have legitimacy on the Kuki side. Above all, there must be accountability.

Ultimately, there is a widespread perception that the peace process is not real, that it is a spectacle, staged from time to time, but not rooted in political will or community consent. The budget for peace is shrinking, the state deficit is growing, and the cost of continued displacement and broken systems is now being borne by the people.

What is absent is what people crave the most: a process of truth, justice, and healing – the will to face the pain honestly, the courage to meet across the lines, the humility to accept that both sides have suffered, and that peace, if it is to last, must be just, inclusive, and real.

What is really needed is a Truth and Reconciliation project to bring both sides together. The victim-perpetrator mindset needs to be put behind. For the ethnic groups to move back to their homes a process must be undertaken which builds confidence through cultural and social integration, through truth and reconciliation and government financed rebuilding of homes.

What is very clearly needed is a process of comprehensive disarmament. Transitional justice, a holistic blend of security, justice, autonomy, and development—together with continued, mediated dialogue—provides the best chance for a stable, united future in Manipur.

As far as political restructuring for autonomy maybe concerned or land and citizenship reforms, these must be not be put on the back burner.